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Private Groups and Public Life: Social Participation, Volun-
tary Associations and Political Involvement in Represen-
tative Democracies. Edited by Jan W. van Deth. London
and New York: Routledge, 1997. 244p. $85.00.
Hanspeter Kriesi, University of Geneva
This collection is based on a workshop, "Social Involvement,
Voluntary Associations and Democratic Politics," held dur-
ing the 1996 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in Oslo. The
central theme of the volume is the relationship between
private groups and public life at a time when the organiza-
tional basis of public life is undergoing a profound transfor-
mation in Western democracies. As is often the case with
conference volumes, this one is quite heterogeneous in
content and uneven in quality. The contributions have one
thing in common: They all present empirical data from
various European countries on different aspects of the com-
mon theme. They differ in terms of theoretical approach,
terminology, and the types of data used.
The variety of theoretical approaches is not unusual; it
closely reproduces the state of the art in research on political
participation. The differences among the various approaches
mostly involve the way they view the organizational link
between the private and the public sphere, or between civil
society and the state. In order to designate the relevant
organizational structures, some authors speak of "voluntary
associations," others of "interest groups" (or "public interest
groups"), yet others of "social movement organizations." To
illustrate the conceptual disarray of the field, consider the
example of trade unions. The contributors refer to them
variously as "occupationally based voluntary associations"
(Moyser and Parry), "social organizations" (Billiet), "interest
organizations" (Oldersma), "intermediary organizations"
(Lelieveldt), "goal-oriented associations" (Joye and Lau-
rent), or "traditional political organizations" (Wessel). With
respect to the types of data used, the various contributions
also take widely different approaches: individual survey data,
organizational data, or macrostructural data. In one instance,
the excellent last chapter by Dekker, Koopmans, and van den
Broek, data from different levels are combined to resolve an
interesting macro-micro puzzle.
Taken together, the twelve chapters allow one to discern
some important trends with respect to political participation
in Western Europe. First, several contributions confirm the
existence of a close link between social participation and
political participation. Some allow one to differentiate the
received wisdom. On the basis of Danish survey data for
example, Gundelach and Torpe, confirm the mobilizing
function of social participation but not its socializing func-
tion. That is, contrary to Tocquevillian expectations, social
participation does not seem to contribute to political toler-
ance and to more encompassing commitments to the public
good in general.
Second, several contributors hint at a profound transfor-
mation in the organizational linkage between the social and
the political spheres. Gundelach and Torpe notice that
Danish voluntary associations are becoming more detached
from their social base; they are becoming "catch-all" associ-
ations. Similarly, Billiet notices a decline in the traditional
link between membership in unions and health insurance
societies, on the one hand, and voting behavior, on the other
hand, in the case of Belgium. This decline turns out to be
most pronounced in the younger generation, while the polit-
ical preferences of older people still are heavily structured by
social participation. Selle, who analyzes Norwegian women's
associations, to mention yet another example, finds a decline
in the historically powerful mass movements in which women
played an important role. With their emancipation from their
traditional roles, Norwegian women are losing the organiza-
tional society which was their own, that is, the trend has been
toward a less gender-segregated organizational society in
Norway.
Third, a new link between organizations and their mem-
bers is taking shape. This is most clearly described in the very
interesting chapter by Maloney and Jordan on what they call
"protest businesses," that is, organizations such as Amnesty
International, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace. The
authors argue that in these cases the relationship between the
individual and the organization is essentially financial. Mem-
bership is large, participation is minimal, and individuals are
essentially "contracting out the participation task to organi-
zations." It is argued that large-scale "new politics" groups
have done very little to enhance participatory democracy.
Most of the chapters do not try to explain the trends they
find but, rather, attempt to interpret them in terms of the
literature on social capital. The ghost of Putnam hovers over
several contributions, although his sensitivity to causal reci-
procity or "virtuous circles" between social and political
participation is not always shared by the various authors.
Whiteley and Seyd, for example, present a straightforward
linear model to explain the political capital (i.e., trust in
political institutions) of British Conservative Party members
by the level of their social and political activities. The authors
do not take into account that (as suggested by Dekker et al.)
associational life may only flourish in a political culture that
stimulates and perpetuates such trust, and that, by extension,
the individual's associational participation may be enhanced
by his or her trust in the political institutions.
The last two chapters, by Wessels and by Dekker and
others, are more ambitious with respect to explanation.
Wessel presents a modernization theoretical account of the
differences in the organizational capacities of Western Euro-
pean societies. His conclusion is quite straightforward: The
organizational capacity of Western democracies is higher the
more modern these societies are (measured by such macro-
structural indicators as GNP per capita or percentage of
employment in the service sector). His account is not at all
sensitive to cultural and/or institutional differences among
these societies. Actually, it is striking to see that his countries
cluster along the linear trend in quite significant ways: There
are the least modern southern European societies and the
most modern Scandinavian countries, with the Anglo-Saxon
and the consociational democracies forming two groups in
between.
Dekker and colleagues find similar clusters in their chap-
ter, and in fact they juxtapose two patterns of political
participation (p. 209). The first, with the Netherlands as the
example, is characterized by high levels of conventional
organizational participation, low levels of protest participa-
tion, relatively moderate protest forms, and a predominance
of new social movements. The second, exemplified by Spain,
combines low organizational participation with high protest
levels, radical protest forms, and a predominance of mobili-
zation around traditional cleavages. The authors interpret
the differences between these patterns by the variable open-
ness of the institutional structures of the respective political
systems. The only other contribution that makes use of such
institutional differences to account for the patterns of partic-
ipation is the one by Joye and Laurent, who interpret local
participation patterns in Swiss cities in terms of the variable
local political opportunity structures.
As these examples illustrate, the field of political partici-
pation could benefit enormously from a more systematic
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integration of institutional and cultural factors into theoret-
ical accounts. If, in addition, practitioners could agree on a
common conceptualization of the organizational structures
involved, then the field could, indeed, make some important
progress.
The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics,
1968-1970. By Kieran Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997. 270p. $59.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.
Karen Dawisha, University of Maryland College Park
Taking advantage of the release of thousands of new docu-
ments on Soviet and Czechoslovak actions during the ill-fated
Prague Spring in 1968, Kieran Williams has written an
important book that reexamines the underlying motives and
actions of leaders on both sides. While the book can be read
as a history of the entire period 1968-70, its greatest contri-
bution is in the definitive account it provides of Soviet-
Czechoslovak elite interactions leading up to the 1968 inva-
sion. As such, it will be of interest not only to historians of the
Cold War but also to political scientists who specialize in
crisis behavior and bureaucratic politics.
First, a note about sources. Williams has conducted an
absolutely exhaustive study of the available archives in
Prague, Bratislava, and Moscow, although anyone familiar
with the stellar work done by the nongovernmental National
Security Archives and the Cold War International History
Project, both based in Washington, D.C., will know that the
most important Moscow archives were never really open,
with documents trickled out on a highly selective basis by the
chief archivists. What we "know" about Soviet behavior,
therefore, is still what they want us to know. Nevertheless, the
analysis presented in Williams is rich and multifaceted,
particularly when supplemented by a close reading of the
documents, including an excellent annotated set translated
into English and recently published (The Prague Spring '68,
Preface by Vaclav Havel, edited by Jaromir Navratil, 1998).
Viewing the Prague Spring from the perspective of the
postcommunist world, Williams not only benefits from a
wealth of archival sources but also can see the events for what
they really were—an effort to reform a system that ultimately
was unreformable. Williams does not say so, but surely the
brunt of his analysis pushes us to the conclusion that the
Prague Spring could not have succeeded in creating "social-
ism with a human face" because the socialist system at that
time was unreformable, based as it was on terror, dictator-
ship, and economic nonsense.
Knowledge of this fact is widely appreciated in contempo-
rary Prague, where the thirtieth anniversary of the Prague
Spring went uncelebrated, in stark contrast to the streams of
books, films, and rallies that commemorated the fortieth
anniversary of the 1956 uprising in neighboring Hungary. The
Czechs have chosen not to make the Prague Spring part of
what Harvey Kaye (The Powers of the Past: Reflections on the
Crisis and the Promise of History, 1991) has called their "grand
governing narrative." The question is why.
Williams provides us with some clues. Archival documents
in the hands of a neutral historian can be a powerful leveler,
and while the image of Soviet decision makers as essentially
ruthless, cynical, and determined can be resupported by the
new documents, the previous image of Czechoslovak reform-
ers as essentially courageous, visionary, and brilliant does not
perhaps bear up so well. Consider some of the details brought
out by Williams. Czechoslovak reformers "suffered from a
delusion of sovereignty" (p. 5) based on the fact that they had
no Soviet troops stationed on their borders. As Dubcek
subsequently recalled, "I thought that we were much freer
than we were." But Dubcek himself had grown up in the
USSR, had been imprisoned in Bratislava during the Stalinist
purges, and had participated in meetings in which the Czech-
oslovaks had been pressured to accept Soviet troops. So this
statement seems fanciful, if not pathetic, in hindsight.
Another example is the Soviet perception of the strength
and objectives of the Czechoslovak opposition, led by Vaclav
Havel and other nonparty activists during 1968. The Party's
Action Program, published in April 1968, called for the
reform of socialism and the lifting of censorship, but it did
not call for anything approaching a multiparty system. When
activists like Havel and the philosopher Ivan Svitak argued
for the creation of a true opposition, and when the Club of
Non-party Engagees (KAN) and K-231 (a pressure group to
rehabilitate victims of Stalinism) were established, the Dub-
cek leadership then and subsequently did little to clamp
down on this activity. The Soviet embassy is much derided
by Williams and by previous authors, including myself (The
Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 1984) and Jiri Valenta (Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision,
1991), as having a paranoid and distorted view of the events
taking place in Prague. Yet, again in hindsight, perhaps
it is not unreasonable to conclude that in fact the embassy
had a clearer picture of Soviet interests and how to pro-
mote them than the Czechoslovak leaders had of their
own.
When Brezhnev, in a May 1968 Politburo meeting, de-
nounced the Action Program as "a bad programme, opening
up possibilities for the restoration of capitalism in Czecho-
slovakia" (p. 73), was he not right? Is it not reasonable to
assume that, had the Dubcek team stayed in power, commu-
nism might have collapsed sooner than it did? As Havel
stated, given that Dubcek did not resist the Soviet invasion
(and psychologically could not resist it), it was a blessing for
the opposition that the Czechoslovak Politburo was removed
to Moscow for forced and phoney negotiations, since this
"lifted a restraining hand on the public" (p. 132). Indeed,
Czechoslovak communist leaders themselves echoed Mos-
cow's concern about collapse. While in Moscow, an extraor-
dinary congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was
called, and Zdenek Mlynar, then among the detainees in
Moscow, argued that unless they were allowed to return
immediately, a new politburo would be chosen who would
not be willing to do Moscow's bidding, and "Czechoslovakia
will quickly become bourgeois" (p. 134).
While we might disagree (even profoundly) with Moscow's
definition of its interests, and the actions taken to promote
them, can we really conclude, based on the information so
ably presented by Williams, that the invasion was irrational,
that leaders were ill-informed, or that the decision was in any
way the result of bureaucratic infighting (frankly a ridiculous
and insupportable claim further refuted by Williams)? Even
the fact that dispute continues about whether there were
some disagreements in the Soviet Politburo over when or
whether to invade seems more the stuff of historical footnotes
than real substance. It is clearly the case that no one on the
Politburo would have allowed Czechoslovakia to leave the
socialist camp, whether by stealth, mistake, or open counter-
revolution. The only real question was whether Dubcek
himself was able and/or willing to keep the country within the
bloc.
Of all the documents discussed by Williams, it is those that
reveal Dubcek's own gullibility and weakness that, for this
reviewer, are most revealing. After all, Dubcek has been the
almost sacrosanct hero of so many standard accounts (start-
ing with William Shawcross, Dubcek, 1970, and Gordon
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